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LOOKING BACK: THE FULL-TIME BASELINE IN 
REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Christine Venezia* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has focused an enormous 
amount of attention on the law of regulatory takings. Beginning in 
1922, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a regulation 
amounts to a taking if the regulation goes "too far" in denying an 
owner economically viable use of his or her land. l Unfortunately, the 
Court has never precisely defined what constitutes "too far." Conse-
quently, information on regulatory takings is plentiful and the Court 
generally has examined takings cases on an ad hoc basis.2 In doing so, 
the Court has applied a series of balancing tests in order to determine 
if a regulation effects a taking.3 These tests have tended to focus on 
the pre-regulation and post-regulation effects on the economic value 
of the land, balancing the burdens suffered by property owners 
against the public benefits of regulation.4 
In determining the economic impact of a regulation, the Supreme 
Court has focused on whether the regulation has frustrated the in-
vestment-backed expectations of the landowner.5 The Court also has 
attempted to determine the degree to which the regulation diminishes 
* Business Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
2 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
3 James G. Murphy, Changing Times: The Time Baseline Question in Regulatory Takings 
Analysis, TEACHER'S UPDATE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 263 
(1995); see Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260--61 (1980). 
4 Murphy, supra note 3, at 263; see Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260--61. 
5 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495. 
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a property's value.6 This inquiry requires a determination of how 
much of the landowner's property to take into account and how long 
a time period to consider. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed repeatedly the 
physical baseline question: how much of the property to consider 
when determining the impact of a regulation.7 The Court, however, 
has not answered the chronological baseline question: ''What period 
of time should the Court look at to establish the diminution effects of 
the regulation?"B Currently, there are two dominant theories of 
chronological baseline determination.9 The "full-time" baseline theory 
supports beginning a regulatory takings determination by looking 
back to the original time of the purchase of the property.10 The "after-
math-time" baseline theory argues for beginning the takings deter-
mination at the time the regulation actually comes into effect.l1 
When determining the economic impact of an ordinance on a land-
owner, the Court has looked at the owner's investment-backed expec-
tations and the extent to which the regulation has diminished the 
value of the property.12 The choice of a time baseline greatly affects a 
court's determination as to how the regulation has diminished both 
the property value and the investment-backed expectations of the 
property owner.13 
Consider the following scenario as to how a time baseline can affect 
the inquiry in terms of investment-backed expectations: 
Jim, a developer, buys for $100,000 fifty acres near a lake for the 
purpose of building summer homes on the land. Jim develops 
thirty-five acres, building seventy summer homes, at a cost of $3.6 
million. He then sells the homes for $7 million, giving him an 
overall profit of $3.4 million. A regulation, zoning the land as 
protected wetlands, then prevents Jim from developing the re-
maining fifteen acres. Although he could have developed the re-
6 See id. 
7 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (implying 
endorsement of conceptual severance and partial physical baseline); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 
(rejecting conceptual severance and instead looking at parcel of land as whole); Penn Central, 
438 U.S. at 130-31 (holding takings jurisprudence does not divide parcel of land into separate 
segments but rather looks at parcel as whole). 




12 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493, 496 (1987); Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1977). 
13 Murphy, supra note 3, at 267. 
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maining land at a profit of approximately $1.5 million, Jim's fifteen 
acres are now valued at a little over $10,000, with no potential for 
greater profit. 
201 
In such a case, if a court were to choose to measure the effect of the 
regulation against the investor's expectations on the day before the 
regulation took effect, the court probably would find that the regula-
tion had "wiped out" Jim's investment.14 Before the regulation, Jim 
had a potential profit of $1.5 million, which the regulation sub-
sequently reduced to the $10,000 remaining value in the land. If, on 
the other hand, the court shifts its focus to a full-time baseline and 
begins its inquiry when Jim made his investment, the result is much 
different. Jim made $3.4 million in profit on a $100,000 investment. He 
recaptured his entire purchase price and realized almost seventy 
percent of his potential profit. Although he did not realize all of his 
potential profit, Jim was able to make what most people would con-
sider a reasonable return on his investment.15 By providing a more 
complete picture of the owner's investment history in the property, 
the full-time baseline reveals that the owner largely achieved his 
investment-backed expectations, thereby undercutting arguments 
about unconstitutional takings and leading to a fairer result.16 
Although there has been no ruling by the Supreme Court on the 
time baseline issue in the regulatory takings context, there is a large 
body of law regarding aesthetic zoning regulation of billboards, and 
the use of amortization periods for nonconforming uses as a method 
of compensation.17 Amortization provides an investor with a limited 
amount of time to continue a prior existing nonconforming use.18 Bill-
board amortization cases support the investment-backed expectations 
argument for a full-time baseline.19 Typically, billboard cases focus on 
14 See id. at 265. 
15 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (stating that no taking occurred because Penn Central 
not only profited but also earned "reasonable return" on investment, yet never defining "rea-
sonable return"); Murphy, supra note 3, at 265. 
16 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 265. 
17 See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 173, 178 (4th Cir. 
1988); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1273, 1274 (4th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southamp-
ton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 1983). 
18 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 785 (4th Cir. 1990); 
see Alison E. Gerencser, Removal of Billboards: Some Alternatives for Local Governments, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 900, 913 (1992). 
19 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1273, 1274; Suffolk Outdoor 
Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48; Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
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whether a fixed time of recoupment after the regulation is valid, but 
in doing so, use a full-time baseline in order to determine recoup-
ment.20 The billboard amortization cases demonstrate that courts gen-
erally have looked to profits made before a regulation took effect as 
well as after. This body of law is compelling support for the rationality 
of using a full-time baseline that extends to the time of the original 
purchase of the property. 
This Comment examines the issue of the time baseline in regulatory 
takings analysis. Section II traces the historic development of takings 
jurisprudence and demonstrates the Supreme Court's general lack of 
attention to the time baseline issue. Section III reviews the history 
of billboard regulation and the use of amortization as a means of 
compensation. In addition, this section explores the takings analysis 
as applied to billboard amortization cases and the use of a full-time 
baseline. Finally, section IV includes a discussion of how the language 
of several of the Court's decisions support the rationale of a full-time 
baseline. Section IV also explores how the billboard amortization 
takings analysis may be applied to regulatory takings. Section IV 
concludes with an argument that the full-time baseline approach used 
in the billboard cases should apply to regulatory takings cases. 
II. OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that private property shall not "be taken for 
public use, without just compensation" by the federal government.21 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the 
Takings Clause applicable to the states.22 Whether a regulation vio-
20 Murphy, supra note 3, at 266; see Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 
1273, 1274; Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48. In deciding whether the 
property owner has sufficiently recouped his or her original investment, the courts must look 
back to the date of the original purchase to determine the initial investment. Once the courts 
know the amount of the initial investment, they must then calculate how much of the investment 
has been or will be recouped in total, meaning both before the regulation and during the 
amortization period. In looking at whether the amortization period allows sufficient recoupment, 
the courts seem to be adding the recoupment made during the amortization period to the 
recovery of investment achieved before the regulation in order to determine whether the 
property owner has sufficiently recouped his or her investment as a whole. In other words, the 
courts look at both the pre-regulation and post-regulation profits of the property owner. By 
starting at the date of the original purchase and determining the recovery of investment since 
that date, the courts are using a full-time baseline. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1977); Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. 
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lates the Fifth Amendment, and therefore constitutes a taking, has 
been an important issue in land-use regulation.23 
Takings generally are classified as either physical or regulatory 
takings.24 The regulatory takings issue was first addressed in cases 
concerning harm-prevention rules.25 An early United States Supreme 
Court case, Mugler v. Kansas,26 best illustrates the Court's initial 
approach to takings cases.27 Until 1922, the Supreme Court cited 
Mugler in support of the position that the Takings Clause did not 
require the federal government to compensate landowners when it 
exercised its police powers and negatively affected property values.28 
In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the United States 
Supreme Court found that a compensable taking could occur when a 
regulation, rather than a physical occupation, restricted a landowner's 
use of property.29 The Court held that the Kohler Act, which prohib-
ited a coal company from mining the coal serving as support for the 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). For the purposes of clarity, the author will refer to the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause when discussing federal, state and local government actions. 
23 Katherine D. Parsons, Comment, Billboard Regulation After Metromedia and Lucas, 31 
Hous. L. REV. 1555, 1581 (1995). 
24 Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its Viability, 
23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 589 (1995). Courts always have found physical takings much easier to 
analyze. Id. Early, strict readings of the Takings Clause held that a compensable taking occurred 
only through physical encroachment, occupation, or invasion of one's property. See Parsons, 
supra note 23, at 1584. The physical occupation rule set forth in the early interpretations of the 
Takings Clause is still adhered to today, as shown by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Parsons, supra note 23, at 1584-85. In Loretto, the United States 
Supreme Court found a taking when a New York City ordinance required an apartment-house 
owner to allow installation of small television cable connections in the units of her apartment 
building. 458 U.S. at 421. The Court decided that in a physical occupation case, a city must pay 
compensation to the landowner even if diminution in the property value is minimal. I d. at 434-35. 
25 Sarah Long, Note, Tipping the Scales for the Private Property Owner: Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REV. 213, 222 (1995). 
26 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
:>:1 Padilla, supra note 24, at 591; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405--13 (1915) 
(finding no taking when nuisance regulation of brickworks on clay-rich land reduced value from 
$800,000 to $60,000). In Mugler, the United States Supreme Court upheld legislation banning 
the sale and manufacture of alcohol. 123 U.S. at 670, 671. The legislation no longer allowed the 
property owner to use his property as a brewery, thereby greatly diminishing his property 
value. Id. at 657. The Court found that the prohibition was a legitimate use of the police power 
for a public purpose. See id. at 661-62, 668-69. Thus, the Court rejected the property owner's 
argument that the regulation was a taking under the Fifth Amendment and concluded that no 
compensation was required. Id. at 668-69, 671; Long, supra note 25, at 222. 
28 Suzanne Glover-Ettrich, A Newly-Minted Hurdle for City Planners: Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 559, 570 (1995). 
29 Jonathan E. Cohen, Comment, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and 
Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 313 (1995); see 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412, 415--16 (1922). 
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surface land, constituted a compensable taking.30 Although the Court 
previously had upheld the government's aggressive exercise of police 
power in land-use regulations,31 in Pennsylvania Coal it decided that 
if the regulation did not provide a balance of benefit between the 
regulated property owner and the community at large, the use of the 
police power could not justify the regulation.32 Specifically, the Court, 
in an opinion by Justice Holmes, weighed the coal company's valuable 
property interest threatened with destruction against a limited public 
interest in a "single private house."33 Justice Holmes stated that 
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."34 In this case, the Court 
found that the regulation indeed had gone "too far" and therefore 
concluded that the regulation was unconstitutional.35 The Court, how-
ever, never articulated what time frame should be used in evaluating 
the diminution in land value. 
Following the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal and the 1926 Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.36 opinions, more than a half century 
lapsed before the Supreme Court revisited the land-use regulatory 
takings issue in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.37 
Recognizing that it had never adopted a "set formula" for the Takings 
Clause, the Court in Penn Central developed a multi-factor balancing 
test to determine when a government regulation that diminishes the 
value of property amounts to a taking.38 The three factors the Court 
evaluated were the economic impact of the regulation, the regulation's 
interference with the "investment backed expectations," and the 
character of the action.39 Using this balancing test, the Court found 
that the ordinance's prohibition of the use of air rights above Penn 
30 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414, 416; Padilla, supra note 24, at 591. 
31 Long, supra note 25, at 223. 
32 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, 414. 
33 Id. 
34Id. at 415. 
35 See id. at 416. 
36 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The United States Supreme Court in Euclid upheld the constitution-
ality of a comprehensive zoning ordinance despite the fact that the ordinance diminished the 
plaintiff's property values substantially by prohibiting industrial uses in residential zones. Id. 
at 384, 389-90. 
37 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved a challenge to New York City's historic landmark 
designation of Grand Central Terminal, which effectively deprived the railroad owner of the 
right to develop the air space above the existing eight-story terminal. Id. at 115, 130. 
38 Id. at 124-25; Long, supra note 25, at 225. 
39 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; Long, supra note 25, at 225. 
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Central station was not a compensable taking.40 In evaluating the 
economic impact of the regulation, the Court looked at the effects on 
the parcel as a whole to determine whether the ordinance was a 
taking.41 Furthermore, although the regulation in question interfered 
with the plaintiff's investment-backed expectations, the Court held 
that so long as the plaintiff was capable of earning a "reasonable 
return," there was no compensable taking.42 
Penn Central represents one of the first opinions in which the 
Court addressed the physical baseline issue.43 Once again, however, 
the Court failed to discuss the time baseline. The Penn Central deci-
sion was the beginning of a period during which the Court continued 
to uphold land-use regulations despite their impact on individual 
property owners.44 Although the multi-factor test set out in Penn 
Central is still influential in the takings analysis, the Court soon 
modified it with a different two-part test that placed more emphasis 
on governmental purpose.45 
The two-part test established by Agins v. City of Tiburon,46 stated 
that a taking could exist if the regulation (1) did not substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) denied an owner all eco-
nomically viable use of his or her land.47 The United States Supreme 
Court, however, recognized that "no precise rule determines when 
property has been taken," suggesting that a weighing of public and 
private interests is required.48 Although the Court formulated the 
takings analysis to evaluate whether the regulation denied an owner 
all economically beneficial use of his or her land, the Court once again 
neglected to address the issue of what point in time to begin the 
40 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137, 138. 
41 [d. at 130. Justice Brennan stated that takings jurisprudence "does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have 
been entirely abrogated." [d. Rather, Justice Brennan found that the Court must look at "the 
nature and extent of the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole." [d. at 130--31. 
42 [d. at 136, 138; Padilla, supra note 24, at 593. With respect to the character of the action, 
the Court held that "the restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the 
general welfare." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. 
43 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130--31. 
44 Cohen, supra note 29, at 318. 
45 See Long, supra note 25, at 227. 
46 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
47 [d. at 260. 
48 [d. at 260-61; Julia Kriedler Hickey, Florida Rock Industries v. United States: A Categorical 
Regulatory Taking, 2 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 245, 251 (1995). 
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evaluation of the diminution in property value-at the time of the 
original purchase or at the time when the regulation took effect.49 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,50 approving the Agins two-
part takings rule.51 In Keystone, the Court upheld a subsidence stat-
ute quite similar to the one previously invalidated in Pennsylvania 
Coal.52 In looking at the character of the regulation, the Court held 
that the statute in question advanced legitimate state interests in 
protecting the state's health, environment, and fiscal integrity. 53 The 
Court then looked at the economic impact of the regulation on the 
plaintiffs total property interest.54 In doing so, the Court took into 
account the effect of the statute on all of the plaintiff's mining prop-
erty from 1966 until 1982.55 Careful examination revealed that the 
regulation forced the plaintiffs to leave a total of twenty-seven million 
tons of coal unmined, which equaled less than two percent of the total 
coal in the mines.56 In light of this information, the Court upheld the 
statute, finding that a regulation must render the entire parcel use-
less, not merely a portion.57 Although the Court never explicitly ad-
dressed the chronological baseline question, the language and the 
underlying rationale in Keystone appear to support the idea of a 
full-time baseline.58 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,59 also decided in 1987, 
the United States Supreme Court struck down a building permit 
condition requiring the owners of beachfront property to grant an 
easement enabling the public to pass across the landowners' beach.60 
49 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61. 
50 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
51 Long, supra note 25, at 227; see Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495. In 1987, the United States 
Supreme Court also decided First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles in which the Court stated, for the first time, that if a land use regulation is invalidated 
as a taking, the Fifth Amendment mandates that the government compensate for the temporary 
taking. 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
52 Long, supra note 25, at 227; see Keystone, 480 U.S. at 471, 481-85. 
53 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488; Padilla, supra note 24, at 594. 
54 See Keystone, 487 U.S. at 493, 495, 496. 
55 See id. at 496. 
56 [d. 
57 See id. at 498-99; Padilla, supra note 24, at 594. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion 
in which Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined, arguing that property segmentation can 
be used to ascertain whether a taking has occurred. Padilla, supra note 24, at 594. 
58 See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
59 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
60 [d. at 841-42. 
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The Court held the ordinance invalid in spite of the fact that the 
plaintiff retained considerable value in his land.61 In its analysis, the 
Court stated that if the state had required the plaintiff simply to grant 
a beach easement for public use, the requirement would have repre-
sented a "permanent physical occupation" of the property, and thus 
would have constituted a taking.62 In Nollan, however, one condition 
of the plaintiff receiving the building permit necessary to rebuild his 
home was that he grant the Coastal Commission an easement to the 
beach.63 Because the easement was a condition of the permit, the issue 
was whether the land-use regulation "substantially advance[d] legiti-
mate state interests" without denying the owner all economically 
viable use of his land.64 The Court reasoned that the state's attempt 
to obtain the easement was invalid because the Coastal Commission 
could not establish a sufficient nexus between the condition imposed 
and the plaintiff's request to build.65 By requiring a nexus between a 
land-use regulation enacted under the state's police power and the 
social harm it was designed to ameliorate, the Nollan Court expanded 
the first prong of the test it used in Agins v. City of Tiburon.66 As in 
the previous regulatory takings cases, however, the Court again failed 
to address the time baseline issue. 
Mter announcing the essential nexus requirement in Nollan, the 
Court considered another takings claim in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.67 The Court's 1992 decision focused specifically on 
the second prong of the Agins test, discussing a per se category of 
61 [d. 
62 [d. at 831, 832. 
63 [d. at 828. In other words, if the state had simply told the N ollans that they had to allow 
the public to use a path across their land in order to get to the beach, this would have been 
considered a permanent physical occupation of the property and as such would have been a 
taking. See id. at 831, 832. In Nollan, however, the state did not come right out and demand the 
easement but instead said that it would grant the building permit only if the NoHan family 
allowed the public to use an easement to the beach. [d. at 828. Because the Coastal Commission 
had a right to decide the requirements necessary before a building permit would be issued, the 
easement could be required if it met the conditions laid out by the Court. See id. at 829. 
64 Long, supra note 25, at 229; see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. 
65 Padilla, supra note 24, at 595; see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. The Commission attempted 
to justify the land-use regulation by claiming that the easement was necessary because of the 
diminished visual access to the ocean caused by the NoHan's construction. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
828. The Court found the nexus to be insufficient because the diminished view of the beach 
simply was not alleviated by the easement requirement. See id. at 836-37. 
66 Padilla, supra note 24, at 595-96; see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
67 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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takings that applies when a regulation deprives an owner of all eco-
nomically beneficial use of his or her property.68 
In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court, reversing the South 
Carolina Supreme Court, held that the ordinance constituted a taking 
requiring compensation.69 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
stated that a per se taking occurred "when the owner of real property 
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the 
name of the common good."70 According to Justice Scalia, regulations 
that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land require compen-
sation, except where a restriction essentially implements nuisance 
prohibitions contained in state property law.71 Justice Scalia looked at 
the owner's investment-backed expectations and theorized that if the 
ability to engage in the restricted use did not inhere in the land-
owner's original title, then the government's restriction of that use 
did not amount to a taking.72 
The Court's holding in Lucas indicates that regulations that leave 
property without any economically beneficial use or value will consti-
tute compensable takings.73 In contrast, if a state's common-law nui-
sance principles allow adjacent landowners or the state to restrict the 
use then, according to Lucas, there is no taking.74 By looking back to 
the property owner's original title to determine whether the owner 
had any expectation of being allowed to engage in the restricted use, 
68 [d. at 1019; Parsons, supra note 23, at 1589. In Lucas, the plaintiff was a land developer 
who had purchased two lots of unimproved beachfront property on South Carolina's Isle of 
Palms for nearly one million dollars. 505 U.S. at 1008. After Lucas purchased the land, the South 
Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. [d. at l007~8. The Act prohib-
ited Lucas from building any structures on the environmentally sensitive beachfront lots. [d. at 
1008-09. Because Lucas's lots fell entirely within the area where the statute had forbidden 
construction, he filed suit, claiming that the statute's bar on construction effected a taking of 
his property without just compensation. [d. 
69 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas ruled in Lucas' favor, 
holding that the ban imposed on Lucas's property denied him any economic use of the property 
and rendered the parcel valueless. [d. The court then ordered the South Carolina Coastal 
Council to pay just compensation of $1,232,387.50. [d. The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
reversed the trial court, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed 
again and remanded the case for a determination of actual damages if South Carolina's common 
law of nuisance could not support the regulation. [d. at 1010, 1030-32. 
70 [d. at 1019. 
71 [d. at 1029. 
72 [d. at 1029; Parsons, supra note 23, at 1591. 
73 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, 102&-27; Parsons, supra note 23, at 1591. 
74 Parsons, supra note 23, at 1591; see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (requiring South Carolina to 
prove that existing state property and nuisance law would prohibit Lucas's proposed use of his 
property). 
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the Court's language supports the underlying rationale of the full-
time baseline.75 
The United States Supreme Court soon expanded its takings analy-
sis in Dolan v. City of Tigard,76 to require not only an "essential 
nexus" as set out in Nollan, but also an individual showing of rough 
proportionality between exactions such as permit conditions and the 
"legitimate state interest" that the exactions are supposed to ad-
vance.77 When the owner in Dolan requested permission to build 
within a flood plain, the City of Tigard required, as a condition of the 
permit, that the owner dedicate the land within the floodway for a 
"greenway" and an adjacent strip for a pedestrian and bicycle path.78 
To evaluate Dolan's claim that the regulation was a taking, the 
Court first applied the takings test set out in Nollan.79 The Dolan 
Court initially determined whether an essential nexus existed be-
tween the legitimate state interest and the permit exactions the City 
required.80 The Court found that the prevention of flooding and the 
reduction of traffic congestion were legitimate public purposes as 
previously upheld by the Court, and therefore satisfied the essential 
nexus question.81 
After the Court found an essential nexus, the Court then deter-
mined whether the degree of the exaction the City imposed bore the 
required relationship to the impact of the proposed development.82 In 
selecting the appropriate test to apply, the Court adopted a "rough 
proportionality" test rather than the "reasonable relationship" test 
used by many state courtS.83 In other words, the condition in question 
needed to be roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed 
development.84 The Court found that the City did not meet its burden 
in justifying the floodway and right-of-way dedications as develop-
75 See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
76 114 s. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
77 [d. at 2317. Petitioner Dolan owned a plumbing supply store located in the central business 
district of the city. [d. at 2313. The landowner applied for a permit to expand an existing 
commercial use and also to pave a portion of the property. [d. at 2313-14. 
78 [d. at 2314. 
79 [d. at 2317; Long, supra note 25, at 234. The Nollan court recited the standard; however, 
once it found that the exaction and the purpose did not relate, it went no further in its analysis. 
Long, supra note 25, at 234. 
80 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. 
81 [d. at 2317-18. 
82 [d. at 2318. 
83 [d. at 2319. 
84 See id. at 2319-20. 
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ment conditions.85 Thus, the Court ruled that the exaction constituted 
a compensable taking and struck down the City regulation.86 Once 
again, the Court failed to address the issue of the time baseline. 
As takings jurisprudence has continued to develop, determining a 
regulation's economic impact on land and the diminution in property 
value has led the Court to set forth a number of different theories.87 
Although the Court's tests touch on all areas of the takings analysis, 
it is apparent throughout the cases that the Court has failed to ad-
dress explicitly the issue of what time baseline to use in establishing 
the diminution effects of a regulation.88 In other words, should a 
takings determination begin at the time of the original purchase of a 
property or at the time at which a regulation comes into effect? 
III. BILLBOARD AMORTIZATION AND TAKINGS 
For several decades both state and federal courts have approved 
city and town ordinances calling for the removal of billboards, pro-
vided that the ordinance allowed for a reasonable amortization or 
grace period.89 To determine what constitutes a reasonable period, 
some courts take into account various factors, such as recoupment of 
investment and depreciation of investment.9o The measure of recoup-
ment of investment and the extent of depreciation both support the 
use of a full-time baseline.91 Although the time baseline issue has not 
been addressed in the realm of regulatory takings, the billboard am-
ortization cases successfully have used the full-time baseline in their 
takings analyses.92 
A. What is Amortization? 
Amortization provides a period of time in which a city or town will 
not enforce a new land-use ordinance.93 This grace period allows a 
85 Dolan, 114 s. Ct. at 2321. 
86 See id. 
87 See, e.g., id. at 2317, 2318; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992); NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
88 See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317-18; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. 
89 See Gerencser, supra note 18, at 913, 914. 
90 See Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988); Major 
Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 353 
(Ct. App. 1991); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 
1247-48 (N.Y. 1983). 
91 See infra Section III.B-C. 
92 See infra Section III.B-C. 
93 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 785 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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designated time for a property user either to make the existing use 
conform to the ordinance, or, if a user cannot or will not conform, to 
recover all or part of an investment before the municipality requires 
that the use be discontinued.94 Although courts have upheld local 
government ordinances requiring the immediate removal of signs, 
traditionally, sign ordinances have required that billboard owners 
remove or bring into conformance all nonconforming off-premise signs 
within a reasonable time frame.95 
Courts have allowed a reasonable time frame, rather than immedi-
ate removal, because aesthetic regulation lacks the immediacy of a 
safety regulation.96 Courts have upheld amortization as a valid alter-
native to compensation.97 In effect, amortization periods notify sign 
owners or users that they must comply with an ordinance within a 
certain period of time.98 Consequently, courts have considered amor-
tization periods of different lengths and have approved them as a 
means of allowing an owner to recoup the original investment or 
minimize loss.99 
In the past, courts used precedent to uphold amortization periods 
as a matter of law.loo Parties were not required to present economic 
evidence concerning the value of the removed billboards or the poten-
tialloss. lOl Recently however, courts have begun to require economic 
evidence regarding the value of removed billboards.lo2 In addition, 
courts often conduct an inquiry as to whether amortization periods 
reasonably allow billboard owners to recoup their investments. lOS 
94 [d. 
9S Gerencser, supra note 18, at 913. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. When the courts discuss the amortization period being long enough to allow recoupment 
of investment, this does not always mean full recoupment. See Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 
900 F.2d at 785; Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 262 (N.Y. 1977), appeal 
dismissed,439 U.S. 809 (1978). Several courts have stated that the amortization period does not 
need to be long enough to allow full recoupment of investment but should not result in substan-
tial loss of investment. See Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 900 F.2d at 785; Modjeska Sign 
Studios, 373 N.E.2d at 262. 
98 Gerencser, supra note 18, at 914. 
99 [d.; see, e.g., Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (upholding five-and-one-half-year amortization period), eert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 
(1987); Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (lOth Cir. 1970) (upholding 
five-year amortization period), eert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1979). 
100 Gerencser, supra note 18, at 915. 
101 [d.; see E. B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th 
Cir.), eert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 805 (1970). 
102 Gerencser, supra note 18, at 915. 
103 See id. 
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Such inquiries, by looking back to the date of the investment, utilize 
a full-time baseline.104 
B. Recoupment of Investment as a Condition of Reasonableness 
In deciding whether an amortization period is reasonable, and thus 
not a taking under the Fifth Amendment, courts increasingly have 
pointed to recoupment of original investment as a major factor.105 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Kingl06 offers a recent example 
of this inquiry into recoupment of the owner's original investment.107 
The ordinance at issue was a Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
(TRPA) regulation that prohibited the use of off-premise billboard 
signs, but provided a five-year pre-removal amortization period for 
nonconforming uses.10B The TRP A sued the owners and lessees of 
three billboards because the defendants' signs did not comply with 
the TRP A's sign ordinance.lo9 
104 See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir.1988); 
Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986); Suffolk 
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 1983); Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 353 (Ct. App. 1991). Use of the full-time 
baseline theory instructs that any calculation of diminution in value should begin at the time 
the original purchase took place. The billboard cases, by looking to whether an owner has been 
able to recoup the original investment, necessarily must look back to the date and cost of the 
original purchase to determine how much of that investment the buyer has recovered. In 
beginning with the date of the original purchase, the courts are, by definition, using the full-time 
baseline. See infra section III.B-C. and accompanying text. 
105 Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 353; City of Salinas v. Ryan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc., 234 Cal. Rptr. 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1987); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 
373 N.E.2d 255, 262 (N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978). 
106 285 Cal. Rptr. 335 (Ct. App. 1991). 
107 See id. at 353, 357; see also Ryan, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 623. In Ryan, the court ruled that an 
ordinance prohibiting off-site signs and allowing a five-year amortization period for noncon-
forming signs was reasonable. 234 Cal. Rptr. at 624. The appellant had challenged the city's 
ordinance as an unconstitutional taking without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. [d. at 623. In its decision, the Ryan court cited National Advertising Co. v. County 
of Monterey for the proposition that zoning legislation could mandate terminating noncon-
forming uses if the legislation provided for a reasonable amortization period, considering the 
investment involved. [d. (citing National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
577, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1970». Furthermore, the court pointed to the fact that by the 
time of the trial court proceedings, the appellant had had 15 years to recoup its investment in 
the 19 structures that the ordinance required be removed. [d. The court, in upholding the lower 
court and finding the amortization period reasonable, based its decision on the fact that Ryan's 
investment in the signs and billboards in question had been recouped. See id. at 624. 
108 Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 337. 
109 [d. The TRPA brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the billboards 
were prohibited off-premise signs that had been fully amortized and were now in violation of 
the sign ordinance. [d. 
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The California Court of Appeals, in vacating the decision of the 
lower court, explained that for the purpose of a takings analysis, it 
would base the value of the signs on the original investment and 
construction costs, not the fair market value of the signs or their 
future earning potential.110 Furthermore, the court emphasized that 
reasonableness of an amortization period depends on whether the 
amortization period is commensurate with the original investment 
involved, thereby allowing an owner to recoup the investment in that 
time.111 Factors involved in this analysis included the amount of the 
investment or original cost (including construction costs), the dates of 
construction, and the income expected during the grace period.112 The 
California Court of Appeals remanded the decision to the lower court, 
strongly emphasizing that the lower court should take each of these 
factors into account, with great weight given to the fact that the sign 
owners had a total of fifteen years (ten years in excess of the amorti-
zation period) during which they were able to recapture their original 
investment.113 In fact, court records indicated that the parties had 
stipulated that the advertising or lease income from each sign had 
exceeded the original cost of the signs.u4 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of New York, in Modjeska Sign 
Studios, Inc. v. Berle, U5 also embraced the position that recoupment 
of an original investment is an important factor in determining 
whether an amortization period is reasonable.116 To regulate advertis-
ing signs and structures in the Catskill and Adirondack Parks, New 
York State enacted legislation allowing for a six-and-one-half-year 
amortization period for all nonconforming signs.ll7 At issue in this case 
was whether the state could require, after expiration of the amorti-
zation period, the removal of the nonconforming signs without com-
pensating the owners. us 
110 See id. at 341, 352. The lower court decision held that the amortization period was unrea-
sonable because it was not based on the actual value of the defendants' signs and their useful 
life. [d. at 339. 
111 [d. at 353. 
112 [d. at 353, 357. The salvage value of the signs and the relative value of affected and 
remaining signs were other factors considered by the court. [d. 
113 See Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 357. 
114 [d. at 340. Presumably the court was referring to the advertising and lease income made 
on the signs since the time of the sign's original purchase, meaning that the defendants had 
recouped their original investment. See id. 
115373 N.E.2d 255, 262-63 (N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 833 (1979). 
116 See id. at 262, 263. 
117 [d. at 257. 
118 [d. 
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Modjeska, which owned ninety-six outdoor advertising signs or 
billboards within Catskill Park, sought to enjoin the removal of the 
signs, claiming that the removal amounted to an unconstitutional, 
uncompensated taking.n9 In its analysis of the reasonableness of the 
amortization period, the court stated that "[n]aturally as the financial 
investment increases in dimension, the length of amortization period 
should correspondingly increase."12o Moreover, the court went on to 
state that while an "owner need not be given that period of time 
necessary to permit him to recoup his investment entirely, the amor-
tization period should not be so short as to result in a substantial loss 
of his investment."121 In determining what constitutes a substantial 
loss with regard to the prohibition of billboards, the court recognized 
the importance of the initial capital investment, the investment real-
ized to date, and the life expectancy of the investment.l22 Because the 
lower court had failed to look at each of these factors and had failed 
to make a determination of the extent of the sign owner's recoupment, 
and thus the reasonableness of the amortization period, the court 
reversed and remanded the case.l23 
More recently, in Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of 
RaZeigh,t24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
noted that recoupment of an owner's investment is an important 
factor in evaluating the reasonableness of an amortization period.125 
In Major Media, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that an 
October 1983 ordinance prohibiting off-site signs was invalid because 
it effected a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.126 
The ordinance restricting off-site signs provided a five-and-one-half-
year amortization period for existing nonconforming signs.127 The 
court, in affirming the summary judgment of the district court, stated 
that the five-and-one-half-year amortization period provided an 
owner of nonconforming signs a time during which the nonconforming 
119 [d. at 258. 
120 Modjeska Sign Studios, 373 N.E.2d at 262. 
121 [d. (citations omitted). 
122 [d. 
123 See id. at 263. 
124 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986). 
125 See id. at 1274; cf Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 836 F. Supp. 833, 837 
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (refusing to accept City's assertion that seven-year amortization period was 
sufficient to allow Patrick to recoup investment and holding ordinance invalid). 
126 Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1270. The 1983 ordinance modified a 1979 ordinance by severely 
restricting the size of off-premise signs and prohibiting replacing, renewing or relocating exist-
ing off-premise signs made nonconforming by its terms. [d. 
127 [d. 
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use could continue, thereby allowing the owner to recoup the original 
investment.l28 
In evaluating the owner's ability to recoup an investment, the court 
conceded its inability to say definitively that a five-and-one-half-year 
amortization period would always be long enough to allow a sign 
owner to recoup an investment.129 However, the court ruled that in 
the instant case the amortization period was reasonable.1so In other 
words, the amortization period was reasonable because the plaintiffs 
had not proven that the ordinance did not permit them to recoup their 
investment.131 The evaluation of the recoupment of an owner's original 
investment as a basis for determining the constitutionality of an am-
ortization period, and the willingness to consider the return obtained 
throughout the investment holding period, suggests that the court 
used a full-time baseline.132 
In focusing on the extent of a sign owner's recoupment of an original 
investment as a factor in determining the reasonableness of an amor-
tization period, each of the courts implicitly used a full-time baseline 
in its analysis. l33 Although courts never have stated explicitly that 
they are using a full-time baseline, such a baseline underlies the 
structure of their analysis of the amortization period and the takings 
issue. In deciding if an amortization period is reasonable, courts meas-
ure the recoupment of the original investment.134 Courts never di-
rectly require that the inquiry begin at the date of the original pur-
chase; any calculation of total investment and total return, however, 
necessitates starting at that date. l35 In deciding whether the property 
owner has sufficiently recouped his or her original investment, courts 
would need to look back to the date of the original purchase to deter-
mine what the initial investment was.136 Once the courts know the 
amount of the initial investment, they then calculate how much of the 
128 [d. at 1273. 
129 [d. at 1274. 
130 See id. The plaintiff had not presented enough evidence to show that the period was so 
unreasonable that it constituted a taking. [d. 
131 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274. 
132 See id. 
133 See id.; Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 353 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 262, 263 (N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 39 
U.S. 809 (1978). 
134 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 352, 353; Modjeska Sign 
Studios, 373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
135 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41; Modjeska Sign Studios, 
373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
136 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41; Modjeska Sign Studios, 
373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
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investment has been, or will be, recouped in total-both before the 
regulation and during the amortization period.137 In looking at 
whether the amortization period allows sufficient recoupment, courts 
seem to be adding the recoupment made during the amortization 
period to the recovery of investment achieved before the regulation 
in order to determine whether a property owner has sufficiently 
recouped an investment. In other words, courts appear to look at both 
the pre-regulation and post-regulation profits of the property 
owner.l38 By starting at the date of the original purchase and deter-
mining the recovery of investment since that date, courts are using a 
full-time baseline.139 There is no way to measure recoupment of invest-
ment without looking back to the original date of purchase and deter-
mining how much was spent and how much of that original cost the 
owner has recovered over time. 
c. Applying a Full-Time Baseline by Using Depreciation of the 
Original Investment as a Measure of Recoupment 
Although most courts have addressed recoupment of a sign owner's 
original investment in a discussion of the reasonableness of an amor-
tization period, some courts have gone beyond speaking of recoup-
ment in general terms.l40 Specifically, in deciding the reasonableness 
of an amortization period, a number of courts have used depreciation 
for income tax purposes as an important factor in measuring an 
owner's recoupment of an original investment.141 Using depreciation 
is an explicit use of the full-time baseline. 
137 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41; Modjeska Sign Studios, 
373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
138 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41; Modjeska Sign Studios, 
373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
139 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 352, 353; Modjeska Sign 
Studios, 373 N.E.2d at 262, 263. 
140 See Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir.1988); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 428 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 
U.S. 490 (1981); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 
1247-48 (N.Y. 1983); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 943-44 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1978), em. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). 
141 See, e.g., Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 787, 789 
(4th Cir. 1990) (vacating lower court decision and remanding for findings of aspects of plaintiffs 
business affected by ordinance, including depreciation of signs for tax purposes); Naegele, 844 
F.2d at 178 (remanding to lower court for determination of reasonableness of amortization period 
by making findings pertaining to depreciation taken on billboard, actual life expectancy, and 
income expected during grace period); Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 
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1. Basing Amortization Periods on the Measure of Depreciation 
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,t42 one of the leading cases 
on billboard regulation and amortization, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held that basing an amortization period on the depreciation of 
the billboards was reasonable and did not constitute a taking.143 In 
Metromedia, all existing signs that did not conform to the require-
ment of the city ordinance were ordered to be removed following 
expiration of an amortization period ranging from ninety days to four 
years, depending upon the location and depreciated value of the 
sign.144 The relevant amortization period for each sign was computed 
by determining the original cost of the sign, including the cost of 
installation, and then deducting ten percent of that cost for each year 
the sign was standing prior to the effective date of the ordinance.145 
The resulting figure was the "adjusted market value."146 The ordi-
nance also provided an abatement schedule, ranging from one year 
for signs with an adjusted market value ofless than $500, to four years 
for signs with an adjusted market value in excess of $20,000.147 
The court stated that determining the reasonableness of an amor-
tization period as applied to each billboard required an evaluation of 
factors such as the billboard's cost, its depreciated value, and the 
billboard's remaining usefullife.148 The court held that the formulation 
of an amortization period, based on the depreciated value of a sign, 
was not facially unreasonable and therefore did not constitute a tak-
122 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying reasonableness test and using variety of factors, including depre-
ciation of signs for income tax and other purposes), cm. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1979). 
142 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
143 Id. at 409. The ordinance at issue prohibited all off-site outdoor advertising display signs. 
Id. For income tax purposes, a depreciation deduction reduces the amount of ordinary income 
or cash flow that must be reported. Kevin M. Cunningham, Note, Which Concept of Depreciation 
Should Guide Us? Trying to Develop a Consistent Framework for the Federal Income Thx 
System, 14 VA. TAX REV. 753, 754 (1995). This deduction represents a clear tax advantage to 
the taxpayer because it allows the taxpayer to shelter a certain part of cash flow from being 
taxed. See id. The taxpayer subtracts the permitted depreciation from the cost of an asset to 
determine its adjusted basis. Id. The allowable depreciation is usually determined by a relevant 
schedule set out by the tax laws. See id. 
144 Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 410. 
145 Id. at 426. 
146 Id. 
147Id. at 426 & n.29. Because the plaintiff had challenged the ordinance as facially unconsti-
tutional, the court did not address the issue as to whether the amortization schedule was valid 
as applied. Id. at 428. Therefore, the court made no finding as to whether four years would 
always be enough time for a billboard owner to recoup the investment, especially if the bill-
board's remaining value was over $20,000. Id. 
148 Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 428. 
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ing.149 Thus, although not implementing the practice of determining 
recoupment of the sign owner's investment based on depreciation 
taken, the court approved the practice for the future and instructed 
the lower court to make the actual determination.l50 
Similarly, in Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Dur-
ham/51 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
required the district court to make findings pertaining to the depre-
ciation of the billboards, the expected useful life of billboards, and the 
income expected during the grace period.152 In Naegele, the City of 
Durham's billboard ordinance prohibited off-premise advertising 
signs, except alongside interstate or federally-aided primary high-
ways.l53 The ordinance provided an amortization period of five-and-
one-half years before it prohibited nonconforming signs. 1M The plain-
tiff claimed that the life of the billboards far exceeded the 
amortization period, making the ordinance unconstitutional.l55 
In determining whether the ordinance constituted a taking, the 
court in Naegle, like the court in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, did not purport to hold that five-and-one-half years always 
would be enough time for an owner of a sign to recoup his or her 
149 [d. In using the words "depreciated value," the court was referring to the depreciation that 
had been taken for tax purposes, which may not necessarily have reflected the real economic 
value remaining in the billboard. See id. at 427, 428. 
150 [d. at 428. 
151 844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988). 
152 [d. at 178; see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 
789 (4th Cir. 1990). In Georgia Outdoor Advertising, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit once again remanded the case for further findings. [d. The appeals court stated 
that the lower court had failed to address the issue of whether the ordinance, with its four-year 
amortization period, constituted a taking of property without just compensation. [d. at 784. 
Recognizing that an amortization period provided a time during which a user could recover all 
or part of his investment, the court ordered an examination of factors such as the cost of the 
billboards that could not be used, the depreciation taken on the billboards, and their actual life 
expectancy in order to determine whether the amortization period had in fact been reasonable 
and allowed recoupment of investment. See id. at 785, 787, 789. The court also stated: 
[T]he often stated majority rule that an amortization period for a nonconforming use 
is valid if it is reasonable, in a sense both overstates and understates the role of 
amortization. That is, because an ordinance without such a provision may be constitu-
tional, in rare cases even the briefest amortization period would not be unreasonable. 
Conversely, because an ordinance could accomplish a taking after the expiration of a 
very long amortization period, in other rare cases an amortization period would not be 
reasonable. 
[d. at 786 (citation omitted). 
163 Naegele, 844 F.2d at 173. 
154 [d. 
155 See id. at 175. 
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investment.156 The court wanted more findings regarding the effect of 
the ordinance on the plaintiff's business and required the lower court 
to consider the economic impact of regulation on the claimant and the 
"extent to which the regulation ... interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations."157 The court found it necessary to deter-
mine the depreciation of the signs, the income expected during the 
grace period, and the salvage value of the billboards that could not be 
used, in order to address whether a taking had occurred.15s In instruct-
ing the lower court to consider the depreciation taken on the bill-
boards as a measure of recoupment of investment, the court was using 
a full-time baseline.159 
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego and Naegele Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, the courts, by allowing the 
determination of a proper amortization period to be based on the 
amount of time necessary to allow full depreciation of the billboard, 
explicitly were using a full-time baseline.160 The courts were utilizing 
a full-time baseline in that they were requiring the takings analysis 
to begin at the date of the original purchase.161 In other words, al-
though the courts never made a determination as to the constitution-
ality of the amortization period, they were directing the lower courts 
to make just such a determination by calculating how much deprecia-
tion had occurred on the property since the date of its original pur-
chase.162 
2. Using Depreciation as a Basis for Measuring Recoupment of 
Investment 
Although the cases discussed in the previous Section demonstrate 
that courts are finding that there should be an inquiry into deprecia-
tion of a sign owner's property, none of the cases used the measure-
ment of depreciation as a basis for deciding whether the amortization 
period was actually reasonable as applied.163 The following cases simi-
larly have endorsed evaluating the extent of an original investment's 
156 See id.(citing Major Media ofthe Southeast v. Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986». 
157 See id. at 176. 
158 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 178. 
159 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
160 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 428. 
161 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 178; Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 428. 
162 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 178; Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 428. 
163 See Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 787, 789 (4th 
Cir. 1990); Naegele, 844 F.2d at 178; Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 428. 
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depreciation.l64 In addition these cases, rather than only theoretically 
endorsing the use of a full-time baseline, have gone one step further 
and actually decided the reasonableness of an amortization period by 
determining if the depreciation of a billboard was sufficient to support 
a finding that an owner had recouped his or her investment.165 Courts, 
in using depreciation as a measure of recoupment, have used a full-
time baseline by calculating depreciation since the date of the original 
purchase of the billboards. 
For example, in Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 166 the plain-
tiff alleged that an ordinance with a six-and-one-half-year amortiza-
tion period was a taking without compensation in violation of both the 
federal and state constitutions.167 The plaintiff contended that of its 
285 billboards, only two conformed to the requirements of the ordi-
nance and that only three of the remaining billboards could be altered 
to conform to the requirements of the ordinance.168 
The Texas Court of Appeals stated that recoupment of investment 
was the major consideration in determining the reasonableness of the 
amortization period.169 The court concluded that reasonableness re-
quired only that an owner be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
recoup or recover its investment in the structures.170 The court then 
cited evidence that the plaintiff Lubbock Poster would have depreci-
ated its billboards fully by the end of the amortization period afforded 
by the ordinance.l71 Because the plaintiff could depreciate all of its 
billboards fully, the court held that the six-and-one-half-year amorti-
zation period contained in the city ordinance reasonably afforded the 
164 See, e.g., Hatfield v. City of Fayetteville, 647 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Ark. 1983); Suffolk Outdoor 
Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 1983); Lubbock Poster 
Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 942 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). 
165 See, e.g., Hatfield, 647 S.W.2d at 451; Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48 
(citation omitted); Lubbock Poster, 569 S.W.2d at 942. 
166 569 S.W.2d at 942. 
167 [d. at 937, 938. 
168 [d. at 940. 
169 See id. at 94I. 
170 See id. The court also concluded that recoupment or recovery of market value was pre-
cluded as an essential consideration in determining the question of reasonableness. [d. at 942. 
171 Lubbock Poster, 569 S.W.2d at 942. Evidence from the lower court proceedings established 
that the depreciation period customarily followed by Lubbock Poster for billboards for tax 
purposes ranged from five to ten years. [d. Furthermore, of the 456 billboards listed on 
Lubbock's 1975 tax return, all but 51 had been fully depreciated prior to the date of the return. 
[d. In addition, ofthe remaining 51, 37 were fully depreciated with the 1975 return and the other 
14 would be depreciated by January 1, 1982, the conclusion of the amortization period. [d. 
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plaintiff an opportunity to recoup its investment in its billboards, and 
thus no taking had occurred.172 
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in Suffolk Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Town of Southampton,173 held that an amortization 
provision of a town building ordinance was reasonable where billboard 
owners fully had recouped their investments and substantially depre-
ciated their billboards for income tax purposes.174 In an ordinance 
dated May 1972, the Town of Southampton required removal of non-
conforming outdoor advertising billboards on or before June 1, 1975, 
thereby allowing a three-year amortization period.175 Although the 
plaintiff, Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, alleged a taking of its property, 
the town board determined that the plaintiff had purchased its bill-
boards at an average cost of $610 and that, at a rate of $100 per year, 
the signs had been depreciated for tax purposes.176 Largely in light of 
the fact that the plaintiff substantially had depreciated its billboards 
for income tax purposes, the court held that the amortization period 
was reasonable.177 
In using the measure of depreciation as a basis for the validity of 
an amortization period, the courts in Lubbock Poster and Suffolk 
Outdoor Advertising explicitly were applying the full-time baseline 
by requiring that each inquiry begin with the date of the original 
172 See id. at 943-44; see also National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
577,580 (1970) (upholding reasonableness of one-year amortization period as applied to plaintiff's 
31 billboards which had already been fully depreciated for income tax purposes but holding that 
removal of the other 11 signs not yet fully depreciated should await expiration of "reasonable 
amortization period" in order to allow plaintiff to recover original cost). 
173 455 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983). 
174 See id. at 1247-48. 
175 [d. at 1246. 
176 [d. The town board determined that the other petitioner, Collum Signs, Inc., also had been 
depreciating its signs at a rate of $100 per year, meaning its investment was fully depreciated 
prior to 1972. [d.; see also Village of Skokie v. Walton on Dempster, Inc., 456 N.E2d 293, 297 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding sign ordinance with seven-year amortization period reasonable 
where defendant's sign was fully depreciated for federal income tax purposes); Donnelly Adver-
tising Corp. v. Mayor & City Council, 370 A.2d 1127, 1130, 1133 (Md. 1977) (holding ordinance, 
requiring removal of all nonconforming billboards within five-year amortization period, did not 
constitute taking entitling plaintiff to compensation where all but one of signs were fully 
amortized for tax purposes). 
177 See Suffolk, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48; see also City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust 
Co., 647 S.W2d 439, 440, 441 (Ark. 1983) (upholding ordinance with seven-year amortization 
period as reasonable where all billboards had been fully depreciated for income tax purposes); 
Hatfield v. City of Fayetteville, 647 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Ark. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of 
ordinance with seven-year amortization period where billboard owners had depreciated the 
signs significantly for income tax purposes). 
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investment.178 Depreciation begins once an owner purchases a sign 
and begins taking deductions for the cost of the sign on his or her 
income taxes. l79 Courts, in looking at whether a sign has been depre-
ciated fully for income tax purposes, necessarily begin the calculation 
at the original date of purchase. 
Although in a number of the billboard amortization cases it is often 
unclear whether courts implicitly or explicitly are using a full-time 
baseline, the analysis of the general recoupment of investment, or the 
specific measurement of the amount of depreciation taken on a bill-
board since its purchase, necessitates extending the inquiry back to 
the original date of purchase.l80 Only by beginning with the original 
date of purchase could courts have made determinations as to 
whether the provided amortization periods were reasonable. l8l 
Courts have looked back to the cost of the original investment and 
calculated how much of that investment the owner has recouped to 
date or how much of the cost the owner has deducted for income tax 
purposes.l82 If the amortization period provided by each city ordinance 
was long enough to allow for sufficient recoupment of investment 
generally, or to enable a sign owner to depreciate its signs fully for 
income tax purposes, courts have usually upheld the amortization 
period as reasonable and have ruled that no taking occurred.l83 The 
full-time baseline theory as applied in the billboard amortization cases 
supports the rationality of using a full-time baseline in the regulatory 
takings analysis. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FULL-TIME BASELINE 
TO REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES 
In the amortization cases, courts have been willing to use the origi-
nal time of purchase as a baseline when conducting a takings analy-
178 See Hatfield, 647 S.W.2d at 451; Suffolk, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48; Lubbock Poster Co. v. City 
of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 942-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). 
179 See Cunningham, supra note 143, at 754. 
180 See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 353 
(Ct. App. 1991); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48. 
181 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 172, 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Metromedia, Inc. v. City 
of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 428 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Lubbock 
Poster, 569 S.W.2d at 942-44. 
182 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177-78; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Metromedia, 610 P.2d at 
428. 
I&~ See, e.g., Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41; Suffolk Outdoor 
Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48; Lubbock Poster, 569 S.W.2d at 942-44. 
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sis.l84 Although courts have not yet applied this full-time baseline in 
the regulatory takings realm, there is language in several United 
States Supreme Court cases that may indicate support for the full-
time baseline theory.185 In light of the precedent of the billboard 
amortization cases, the Court should adopt the use of the full-time 
baseline for reasons of fairness and consistency. 
A. The Language of United States Supreme Court Decisions 
Lends Support to the Use of the Full-Time Baseline Theory 
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address 
directly the baseline issue in the regulatory takings context, some of 
the language used in regulatory takings cases offers support for the 
application of the full-time baseline.186 Furthermore, the Court's 
definition of property rights yields possible support for the use of a 
full-time baseline in its takings analysis.187 
In both Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City and 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court 
applied a broad understanding of property interests.188 In Penn Cen-
tral, by holding that the inquiry of takings jurisprudence must exam-
ine a parcel of land as a whole, the Court applied a broad interpreta-
tion of property.189 The Court was unwilling to allow the term 
"property" to be manipulated narrowly to produce a finding that a 
taking had occurred when in fact the diminution in value for the 
property as a whole had been slight.190 This rationale of interpreting 
property interests broadly to prevent unnecessary takings determi-
nations is applicable to the full-time baseline. 
Similarly, in Keystone, the Court was willing to evaluate the eco-
nomic impact of a regulation by looking at the plaintiff's total property 
interest.191 Careful examination and calculation of the value of the 
plaintiff's mining property from 1966 until 1982 revealed that the total 
184 See, e.g., Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe, 285 Cal. Rptr. 
at 353; Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48. 
185 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
186 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
187 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
188 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
189 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. A single parcel of property could not be divided into 
smaller segments in order to determine whether the value of a smaller segment had been 
completely diminished, thereby causing a taking. See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496. 
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coal that the plaintiff had been forced to leave in place was twenty-
seven million tons-less than two percent of the coal in the mines.192 
The Court used an inquiry that reached far back into the ownership 
of the coal mine in order to determine what fraction of the coal the 
regulation prevented the owner from mining in comparison to that 
which the owner had extracted and sold for a profit.193 The Keystone 
decision implies that the value of property can be averaged over time 
as well as space.194 While neither of these decisions explicitly endorses 
a full-time baseline, neither do they exclude one.195 In fact, the Court's 
continued use of broad definitions of property and methods for deter-
mining land value appear to support the idea of a full-time baseline, 
since the full-time baseline, in looking back to the time of the original 
purchase, requires using a broad method for determining land 
value.196 
Moreover, while the Court once again did not address explicitly the 
time baseline question in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
the opinion emphasized the original time of purchase as a critical focal 
point of the takings analysis.197 In determining the legitimacy of state 
action, Justice Scalia, in Lucas, called on the courts to look at the 
owner's investment-backed expectations based on the status of both 
property law and nuisance law at the time the owner originally pur-
chased the property.198 Specifically, Justice Scalia looked at the 
owner's investment-backed expectations and concluded that if the 
ability to engage in the restricted use did not inhere in the land-
owner's title, the government's restriction of that use did not amount 
to a taking.199 Whether or not the Court explicitly acknowledged it, 
its reasoning strongly endorsed a full-time baseline.2°O The Court fo-
cused on the owner's original title and looked back to what his original 
expectations were on the date of the investment.201 
192 [d. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
195 See id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. lO4, 130-31 (1978). But see 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 392 (1988 U.S. Cl. Ct.) (reading Keystone 
as rejecting a full-time baseline analysis). 
196 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. 
197 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id.; William C. Leigh & Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Government Zoning Practices 
and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause Formulation: Timing, Value and R.I.B.E., 1993 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 827, 869, 873 (1993). 
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Unlike the regulatory takings cases, the billboard amortization 
cases appear to have addressed more directly the issue of a time 
baseline for takings analysis.202 In analyzing the reasonableness of an 
amortization period and the extent to which the regulation has dimin-
ished the value of the billboard, both state and federal courts, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, have adopted the full-time baseline by begin-
ning their inquiry at the point in time when an owner originally 
purchased the property.203 
B. Applying the Full-Time Baseline Theory to Regulatory Takings 
Billboard amortization case law demonstrates that courts can use a 
full-time baseline effectively in conducting a takings analysis.204 In 
addition, language in several of the Supreme Court's decisions indi-
cate support for, if not de facto usage of, the full-time baseline analy-
sis.205 For reasons of fairness, courts can, and should, apply the full-
time baseline theory advanced in billboard amortization cases to the 
regulatory takings analysis. By using the full-time baseline in regula-
tory takings analyses, courts could create a modified full-time baseline 
that focuses on recoupment of the value of property through the life 
of an investment. 
Consideration of the hypothetical discussed previously in this Com-
ment206 reveals that the choice of a time baseline greatly can affect a 
court's decision as to whether the regulation constitutes a taking.207 
In the hypothetical, Jim is able to develop only thirty-five acres of a 
fifty-acre parcel before an environmental regulation renders the re-
maining fifteen acres undevelopable.208 In evaluating any takings 
claim, the point at which the court begins its calculation of both the 
diminution in property value and the interference with the owner's 
2Q2 See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir.1988); 
Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 
N.E2d 1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 1983). 
203 See, e.g., Naegele, 844 F.2d at 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Suffolk Outdoor Adver-
tising, 455 N.E.2d at 1247-48. 
2IJ4 See, e.g., Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 353 (Ct. App. 1991); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 
455 N.E.2d at 1247-48. 
2Q5 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470,496 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
206 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
2fYl Murphy, supra note 3, at 267. 
208 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
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investment-backed expectations is critical.209 If the court chooses to 
compare the remaining property value on the day after the regulation 
with the property value as it existed on the day before the regulation, 
the court probably will see only the loss of a possible $1.5 million 
profit.210 Therefore, the court likely will find that the regulation wiped 
out Jim's investment and thus effected a taking.211 
If, however, the court uses a full-time baseline in its inquiry and 
looks back to the date of the original purchase, the picture becomes 
much different.212 In that analysis, the court will find that Jim made 
$3.4 million in profit on a $100,000 investment and thus recaptured his 
entire purchase price, in addition to realizing almost seventy percent 
of his potential profit.213 In such circumstances, the court likely will 
find that Jim has made a reasonable return on his investment.214 In 
application, the full-time baseline paints a much fairer picture of Jim's 
investment-backed expectations and supports the argument that the 
regulation has not diminished the value of Jim's land unconstitution-
ally.215 
By focusing on recoupment of investment, as courts do in the bill-
board cases, the inquiry shifts from asking what value remains in a 
piece of property to testing how much of the value of the property 
has been recouped.216 There is a strong argument grounded in the 
concept of fairness that an owner formed his or her investment-
backed expectations of a return on the investment at the actual time 
of the original investment.217 Stated differently, at the time of the 
purchase the investor expected to receive a certain limited return.218 
This return included only the potential for profit that the purchaser 
estimated at the time of purchase.219 
209 Murphy, supra note 3, at 267; see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
210 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 265. 
211 See id.; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding 
that a taking occurs when a regulation deprives owner of all economically beneficial uses of land). 
212 Murphy, supra note 3, at 267. 
213 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
214 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). 
216 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 265. 
216 See Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 
(N.Y. 1983); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 262 (N.Y. 1977), appeal 
dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 942 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1978), em. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). 
217 Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
218Id. 
219Id. 
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In light of the drastic differences that result depending on whether 
courts apply the full-time baseline or the aftermath-time baseline, 
courts should, for reasons of fairness, adopt the use of the full-time 
baseline.220 Jim's hypothetical situation demonstrates that the use of 
an aftermath-time baseline frustrates notions of fairness by allowing 
property owners to supplement their income by recovering damages, 
even after recouping their original purchase price and a substantial 
portion of their investment-backed expectations.221 In addition, an 
aftermath-time baseline may promote unfairness by favoring the al-
ready rich developer over the prospective developer.222 An aftermath-
time baseline would allow for a developer who already has made a 
generous profit to collect for the diminished value of his regulated 
land.223 The developer who already has realized a profit has diminished 
the remaining amount of potential earnings to be used as a baseline.224 
Therefore, it is more likely that his remaining profit will be diminished 
substantially, giving the appearance that the value of his land has 
been destroyed completely.225 
Moreover, the aftermath-time baseline frustrates fairness by pre-
venting the investor who has not yet made any substantial profit from 
being compensated for the regulated portion of the land.226 Because 
there is still enough unrealized profit remaining in the land, it is 
unlikely that courts will find that the regulation constituted a tak-
ing.227 Even if the regulation has diminished the value of land some-
what, all economic use has not been lost.228 Once again, manipulating 
the facts from the hypothetical, if Jim had not yet made any profit on 
his investment, the court could find that, although he initially may 
have had a possible $4.9 million profit, he still has a possible $3.4 
million profit. Therefore, Jim is still capable of earning a reasonable 
return and has not suffered an uncompensated taking of his land. In 
220 See supra notes 206-19 and accompanying text. 
221 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
222 [d. 
223 [d.; see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
224 Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
220 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. As an illustration of this concept using the 
facts of the hypothetical, the court would only see that Jim had a possible $1.5 million profit 
remaining which the regulation then reduced to $10,000. Because Jim had already realized his 
$3.4 million profit the court, using the aftermath-time baseline, would never compare the initial 
$4.9 million possible profit with the $3.4 million profit that Jim already had made. 
226 Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
227 [d. 
228 See id. 
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reality, the investor who has not yet made any profit is penalized 
because the court sees only his possible future profits, while the 
developer who has already earned a profit is overcompensated be-
cause the court sees only the diminution in the remaining value.229 A 
full-time baseline would address these problems and ensure that each 
piece of land is examined, in its entirety, from the date of purchase 
until the passage of the regulation in order to determine the true 
diminution in the value of the land.23°!fa landowner already has made 
a substantial profit or recouped an original' investment, the court 
should find that no taking has occurred.231 
Furthermore, the use of a full-time baseline would provide a clearer, 
more uniform standard in regulatory takings analysis. Instead of the 
uncertainty that currently exists as to how a court will measure the 
diminution in value and what tests a court will use, a property owner, 
as well as a regulating agency, will know that a property's value 
always will be calculated by starting with the original date of pur-
chase.232 In addition, if the United States Supreme Court, in cases such 
as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, is looking to the under-
standing of property rights at the time of the original purchase to 
determine the investment-backed expectations and the legitimacy of 
state action,233 then beginning the inquiry regarding diminution of the 
value of property at the same time is both fair and fully consistent 
with that approach. In other words, a court should begin its takings 
analysis and its inquiry into the economic effect of a regulation on an 
owner's property value at the time of the original investment. His-
torically, courts have addressed questions regarding investment-
backed expectations and diminution of value using much of the same 
229 See id. 
230 See Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 241 (N.H. 1975), overruled in part by BUlTows v. Keene, 
432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981). In Sibson, the court stated in dicta that the plaintiffs had recovered 
their total investment and had made some profit before the regulation had prevented further 
development of the land. 336 A.2d at 241. The court also stated that in light of the past profits 
the plaintiffs' land was not rendered useless, rather they had only been deprived of speculative 
profit. [d. 
231 See id. 
232 See e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 177, 178 (4th Cir. 
1988); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1986), 
em. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 
353 (Ct. App. 1991); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N .E.2d 
1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 1983). 
233 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
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analysis and evaluation.234 Thus, if a landowner's investment-backed 
expectations and the legitimacy of state action depend on the status 
of the law at the time of an original purchase, calculation of the 
diminution in the value of a property also should begin at that same 
point.235 
C. Effect of Factual Differences Between Billboard Cases and 
Regulatory Takings on the Applicability of the Full-Time Baseline 
The billboard amortization cases appear to answer the questions as 
to what time baseline the courts should use in takings cases and what 
is no longer an interference with investment-backed expectations.236 
The courts in billboard case law have looked at amortization as a 
method for owners to recoup the value of their land and to minimize 
loss so that an action is not an unconstitutional taking.237 In looking 
back to the time of an original investment, courts have said that if an 
owner has recaptured enough value, there is no taking.238 Although 
courts effectively have used the full-time baseline in the amortization 
period, there may be some concerns in applying it to regulatory 
takings.239 
One difference between amortization cases and regulatory takings 
cases is that amortization allows an investor a continued financial 
return on an investment after an ordinance is passed.240 This contin-
ued period of financial profit eliminates concerns, like those raised in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, about individuals suffering 
immediate and unexpected losses of returns when the law suddenly 
changes.241 Thus, one appeal of amortization may be that it creates a 
transition period which allows a property owner to deal with the 
234 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-3l. 
235 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
236 See Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1274; Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Eerie, 373 N.E.2d 255, 
262, 263 (N.Y. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of 
Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 942, 943-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); 
Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
237 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783, 785 (4th Cir. 1990); 
see Naegele Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 177, 178; Major Media, 
792 F.2d at 1274. 
238 See Naegele, 844 F.2d at 177, 178; Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 
335, 340-41 (Ct. App. 1991). 
239 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 266. 
240 See Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 900 F.2d at 785. 
241 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Murphy, supra 
note 3, at 266. 
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financial consequences of an ordinance.242 While courts necessarily 
must consider such fairness concerns when evaluating regulatory 
takings claims, the focus should remain on determining how much of 
an original investment an owner has recouped and how much of the 
investment-backed expectations an owner has realized through past 
profits. One possible reason for providing amortization periods in 
billboard regulation may be that the aesthetic zoning occurring in 
billboard cases usually is not considered an extreme public harm.243 
Because aesthetic zoning generally is considered a minor public harm, 
when analyzing a takings claim courts traditionally have found that 
allowing continuing nonconforming uses for a specified period pro-
vides a balance between concerns of fairness to property owners and 
public interest concerns.244 In regulatory takings situations involving 
more serious public harms, however, courts may find that the public 
harm outweighs the fairness issues concerning sudden changes of law 
affecting property owners. Because the regulatory takings cases usu-
ally involve a more serious public harm than aesthetic zoning, the 
factual differences between billboard amortization cases and regula-
tory takings cases are not significant, and should not hinder the ap-
plication of the full-time baseline in regulatory takings cases. 
The use of the full-time baseline is compatible with the United 
States Supreme Court's reasoning in the regulatory takings cases.245 
The recoupment test of the full-time baseline would allow the Court's 
evaluation of the diminution in the value of regulated land to begin at 
the time of purchase and to encompass the entire life of a property.246 
Moreover, the use of the full-time baseline is fairer than use of the 
aftermath-time baseline in that the full-time baseline will not allow 
property owners to be compensated if they have recouped their origi-
nal investment and made a substantial profit before a regulation 
diminished the value of the land.247 
242 See Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 900 F.2d at 785. 
243 Gerencser, supra note 18, at 913. 
244 [d. 
243 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470,496 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
246 See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 175, 176, 178 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 352, 353, 357 (Ct. App. 
1991); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 1247-48 (N.Y. 
1983). 
247 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 266; see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to address 
directly the time baseline issue, several of the Court's opinions using 
regulatory takings analysis contain language that supports the under-
lying rationale of the full-time baseline.248 The Court should look to 
billboard amortization cases where use of the full-time baseline has 
allowed courts to look at the recoupment of an investment over the 
life of the investment.249 Application of the full-time baseline in regu-
latory takings cases would provide a more uniform standard for evalu-
ating the effects of a regulation on a particular piece of property.250 In 
addition, the use of a full-time baseline would lead to fairer results by 
focusing the inquiry on how much of an original investment an owner 
has recouped, rather than asking what value remains in a piece of 
property.251 
248 See supra Section IV.A. 
249 See supra Section III.B-C. 
250 See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 204-31 and accompanying text. 
